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This is clearly a waiver of its security interest in the collateral and the court
rightly held so.
Clovis National Bank v. Thomas is relevant so far as it is applicable to
the area of farm products and the Uniform Commercial Code. Beyond that,
its importance diminishes. Since the Code does not specifically provide for
waiver in a manner which can be uniformly decided by the adopting states,
courts which have held that waiver is not determined by custom and usage
will probably still decide along these same lines. This case still leaves the
interpretation of what constitutes waiver to local courts; and the criteria to
be applied will be local law. Therefore whether or not the states will split
along their present lines still remains to be seen.
John Goryl

VENUE-PROPER FEDERAL FORUM FOR
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company sued the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen for breach of duty under the Railway Labor Act
with respect to a strike. The United States District Court for the District
of Colorado overruled the union's motion to dismiss the action for improper
venue and awarded the railroad damages. The union appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit where the decision was reversed, holding that the union could be sued only in the venue of its residence, and that its residence was not in Colorado. Certiorari was granted
to the United States Supreme Court where it was ruled that the Court of
Appeals improperly applied section 1391(b) of the United States Code,'
thereby changing the venue requirements and abandoning the doctrine that
an unincorporated association is not recognized as a citizen for venue and
diversity purposes. Denver and Rio Grande Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen, 387 U.S. 485 (1967).
Section 1391(b) is the general venue statute governing transitory causes
of action in the federal courts where jurisdiction does not depend solely on
diversity of citizenship. Following its amendment in 1966, the section permits
suit either in the district where all of the defendants reside or in the district
where the cause of action arose. At the time this suit was brought, however,
venue lay only at the defendant's residence, as had been the case since 1887.
Thus, for almost eighty years, proper venue in federal question cases was
128 U.S.C. § 1391(b) reads as follows: "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is not
founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial district
where all defendants reside, except as otherwise provided by law."
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limited to the district of the defendant's residence, whether the defendant
was an individual, a corporation, or an unincorporated association, as in
this instance. During all of this time, down to and including the 1966 amendment, Congress has not expressly defined the residence of an unincorporated
association for purposes of the venue statute.
Before this Supreme Court decision, an unincorporated association was not
recognized as a legal entity separate from its members with the same rights
to venue and diversity as corporations. In 1948 Congress directed that a
corporation could be sued in the judicial district "in which it is incorporated
or licensed to do business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the
residence of such corporations for venue purposes." 28 U.S.C. section 1391(c).
Thus the resolution of this issue was left to the Supreme Court. The purpose
of this note is to ascertain the reason for this change and its implications
for the future.
To effectively understand the concept of venue for unincorporated associations in federal jurisdiction, it is necessary to examine the history of this
topic and of corporate venue. The earliest case in point is Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad2 decided in 1853. In Marshall, the plaintiff maintained that he was a citizen of Virginia and that the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad Co., the defendant, was a body corporate by an act of the General
Assembly of Maryland. The defendant objected that this averment was insufficient to show federal jurisdiction over the case or controversy. The United
States Supreme Court in overruling the defendant's objection presumed that
all stockholders of a corporation are citizens of the state of incorporation
and treated the corporation as a citizen of that state. Through this decision
the Supreme Court sustained federal jurisdiction cases between a citizen of one
state and a corporation of another state regardless of the actual citizenship
of the corporation's stockholders. Thus, corporations became jural entities
which could sue and be sued in the federal courts.
Thirty-six years later, however, in Chapman v. Barney,3 the United States
Supreme Court refused to extend to unincorporated associations the rule set
forth in Marshall. The court held that a New York joint stock company was
not a citizen of a state for purposes of federal diversity jurisdiction as it was
incapable of possessing a corporate charter. 4 This decision provided the
basis for the rule that unincorporated associations are not considered judicial
2 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1853). This remained the law until 1958. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1964).

8 129 U.S. 677 (1889). An earlier district court had taken judicial notice of the fact
that under the laws of New York, joint stock associations were "corporations without
the name," and held that an association of this type was a citizen of New York. Maltx
v. American Express Co., 16 F. Cas. 566 (No. 9002) (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1876).
4 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889).
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persons and therefore the citizenship of their individual members is determinative of federal diversity. 5 Thus, the use of the federal courts was denied
to an unincorporated association if even one of its members was a citizen
of the same state as the other party to the suit.
In 1948 the general venue statute was redrafted as 28 U.S.C. section 1391,
and subsection (c) was added. This subsection provided that corporations
could be sued in any judicial district in which it was incorporated or licensed
to do business or doing business. In 1962, before the Supreme Court had
spoken on the matter, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit attempted
to change the holding of Chapman by its decision in Rutland Railroad Corp.
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.6 In this case three of the defendant
brotherhoods had their headquarters in Cleveland, Ohio. The headquarters
of the fourth brotherhood was located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. The brotherhoods asserted that since they were unincorporated associations, the proper
venue for an action against any one of them would be had only in the judicial
district where their principal place of business was established. The majority,
in deciding Rutland, held that for venue purposes the residence of an unincorporated association is assimilated to that of corporations, and includes
all judicial districts in which an unincorporated entity is doing business as
well as its principal place of business. The court based its decision on Judge
Learned Hand's opinion in Sperry Products Inc. v. Association of American
Railroads.7 In that instance, Judge Hand stated that for venue purposes, as
well as other procedural incidents, an unincorporated association should be
considered a jural entity, and that the only practical approach to the procedural problems created by actions involving unincorporated associations
was to assimilate their treatment to that accorded corporations. Thus the
court extended the process of assimilation which Judge Hand advocated by
incorporating the treatment of unincorporated associations for venue purposes
with the expanded concept of corporation residence as set out in 28 U.S.C.
section 1391(c). The court reasoned that if an unincorporated union was
carrying on sufficient activities in a particular judicial district so that it was
deemed to be doing business there, it would not usually suffer any undue
8
harm if required to stand suit there.
5 Although Chapman v. Barney is most often cited for the general rule, its holding was
initially ignored by the lower federal courts as resting upon bad pleading. See Andrew
Bros. v. Youngstown Coke, 86 F. 585 (6th Cir. 1898). The "proper" leading case is
Great So. Fire Proof Hotel v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900). See Comment, Unions as
JudicialPersons, 66 YALz L.J. 712, 742-44 (1957).
0307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 954 (1963). Although not mentioned by the Supreme Court in Bouligny, it was impliedly overruled when the Court
decided that this was a matter for legislative consideration.
7 132 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1942).
8

Rutland R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, supra note 6, at 29.
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In 1964, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit again departed from
Chapman, but used different grounds than in Rutland. Mason v. American
Express Co.9 was an appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, which dismissed a personal injury complaint
against a joint stock association on the grounds that the defendant New York
association could not be deemed a citizen for diversity purposes, and the
requirement to complete diversity was therefore not met because some of
the defendant's members were citizens of the plaintiff's state of citizenship.
Here the Second Circuit rejected the Chapman rule and held that an unincorported joint stock association should be treated as a citizen of the state
where it filed written articles of association and in which it had its principal
place of business. The court based its decision on three factors. First, in the
Chapman decision, which it rejected, the jurisdictional issue was raised by
the court on its own motion and not by the appellant. Secondly, the court
in Chapman stated flatly that the appellee joint stock company could not be
a citizen of New York unless it be a corporation. The court made no effort
to analyze the rationale of Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad in order
to determine whether the reasons for extending citizenship to a corporation
might apply with equal force to a joint stock association. 10 Lastly, the court
claimed that the Supreme Court opinion in Puerto Rico v. Russell" abandoned the artificial and mechanical rule in favor of a more flexible test of
capacity for citizenship. 12 The reliance on Russell may have been misplaced
since the Supreme Court, in sustaining diversity treatment of a Puerto Rican
limited partnership, recognized an unincorporated association as a judicial
person for diversity purposes based upon the civil law recognition in Puerto
Rico of that type of organization as a legal entity separate from its members. The court found certain corporate-like characteristics compelling its
decision. 13 The appellate court also argued that under New York law an
unincorporated joint stock association, such as this defendant, is created
pursuant to written articles of association, which must be filed like a certificate of incorporation as a public record. This reasoning enabled the appel9 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964).

10 Id. at 395.
11288 U.S. 476 (1933).
12 Mason v. American Express Co., supra note 9, at 393. Cf. Van Sant v. American
Express Co., 169 F.2d 355 (3d Cir. 1948).
13 Some of the attributes of the Puerto Rican association were its rights to "contract
and own property and transact business, sue and be sued, in its own name and right,"
creation by articles of association on public record, endurance beyond the death of
individual members, centralization of management, and absence of personal liability of
members for the associations' acts and debts. Puerto Rico v. Russell, supra note 11,
at 481-82.
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late court to treat the defendant in Mason, the American Express Com14
pany, as a corporation for federal diversity purposes.
One month after the Second Circuit's decision in Mason, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld Chapman in United Steelworkers of
America v. Bouligny,15 thereby creating a conflict in the appellate courts. In
Bouligny the plaintiff corporation sought damages in a North Carolina court
for defamation alleged to have occurred during the course of the steelworkers' campaign to unionize the corporation's employees. The steelworkers,
whose principal place of business purportedly was Pennsylvania, removed the
case to the federal district court. The union asserted that for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction it was a citizen of Pennsylvania, although some of its
members were North Carolinians. The corporation sought to have the case
remanded to the state courts relying on the Chapman principle that an unincorporated association's citizenship is that of each of its members. On
appeal from an interlocutory order, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit reversed and directed the case to be remanded to the state courts.
The appellate court used Chapman as precedent to support its decision, and
found Puerto Rico v. Russell completely inapplicable by saying that the
suit before the Supreme Court was simply one of interpretation of a Puerto
Rican statute and not a question of constitutional diversity jurisdiction.' 6
In interpreting the statute, the Supreme Court, by analogy to a common law
corporation, held that the defendant, a civil law sociedad, had a domicile in
14The characteristics which the American Express Co. possessed which made it
similar to a corporation were listed in the opinion of the district court: (1) The
association did not dissolve or liquidate on the death of an associate as did a partnership; (2) The association could hold real property in the name of its president; (3) The
powers of management could be concentrated in a few associates who formed a selfperpetuating managing body; and (4) The association could be sued without making
all of its associates parties to the action. Mason v. American Express Co., 224 F. Supp.
288, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Compare note 13. But after finding this the district court held
that the association differed from a corporation in a significant respect, individual shareholders could be held liable for the debts of the association, and therefore the Express Co.
could not be treated as a corporation for purposes of federal jurisdiction. The Second
Circuit found, however, the "theoretical liability of individual shareholders actually
becoming operative . . . highly unlikely." Mason v. American Express Co., supra note 9,
at 401.
15336 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1964).
16 The Court, by analogy to a common law corporation, held that the defendant, a
civil law sociedad, had a domicile in Puerto Rico and thus could not claim the domicile
of its individual members to acquire the non-resident status required by 39 Stat. 965
(1917), 48 U.S.C. § 863 (1958), which reads: "The United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico shall . . . have jurisdiction of all controversies where all of the
parties on either side of the controversy are citizens . . . of a State, Territory, or District
of the United States not domiciled in Puerto Rico." Clearly the case does not by any
means hold that the sociedad was a citizen of Puerto Rico for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under article 111. Supra note 15, at 163. For a more complete discussion see

51

CORNELL

L.Q. 827 (1966).
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Puerto Rico and thus could not claim the domicile of its individual members
to acquire non-resident status required by the Organic Act. The appellate
court also reasoned that Russell was reversed by the 1958 amendment to the
diversity statute which added 28 U.S.C. section 1332(c), which directed that
corporations should be deemed citizens with dual citizenship, first in the
state of incorporation and also in the state which was their principal place
of business. Before the amendment the statute spoke only of citizens and
not of corporations, therefore it was a question merely of interpretation.
With the Bouligny decision a conflict was created in the appellate courts as to
the validity of Chapman as the present law.
In 1965 certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was granted in
Bouligny.'7 The Supreme Court upheld the law as established in Chapman,
and settled the conflict existing in the appellate courts between the Second
and Fourth Circuits. The Supreme Court was apparently sympathetic with
those who would reverse Chapman, but believing this properly a matter for
legislative consideration, felt they could not adequately or appropriately
enunciate an alternative.' 8 Mr. Justice Fortas speaking for the court stated
the majority's position:
Whether unincorporated labor unions ought to be assimilated to the status of
corporations for diversity purposes, how such citizenship is to be determined, and
what if any related rules ought to apply, are decisions which we believe suited
to the legislative and not the judicial branch, regardless of our views as to the
intrinsic merits of petitioner's argument-merits stoutly attested by widespread
support for the recognition of labor unions as judicial personalities. 19
The Supreme Court in Bouligny could have abandoned Chapman if it had
taken the stand that Puerto Rico v. Russell had breached the doctrinal wall
of Chapman, and that step already taken, there was now no necessity for
enlisting the assistance of Congress. However, the court did not feel that
Puerto Rico furnished the precedent that was required,2 0 since the problem
which it presented was that of fitting an exotic creation of the civil law,
the sociedad en comandita (limited partnership), into a federal scheme with
which it was incompatible. The decision in the principal case, of course,
indicates that the court did not wait for legislative action to give legal existence to unincorporated associations.
Prejudice is another factor which courts in the past have taken into consideration when deciding diversity cases. Originally, federal jurisdiction over
controversies between citizens of different states21 was considered necessary
17 United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, 383 U.S. 145 (1965).
18 Id.at 149.
1Old. at 153.
20
Id. at 151.

21 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
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to protect out-of-state litigants from local prejudice in state courts. 22 It was
always feared that a foreign litigant would be prejudiced by placing his
case before a local and hostile jury, with unfamiliar and perhaps inadequate
procedure.2 3 Furthermore, impartial application of the law could not always
be expected from judges whose method of appointment and tenure often
placed them at the mercy of local politics. 24 Today some commentators argue
that even if local prejudice existed in 1789, it exists no longer.25 There are
others, however, who feel that actual prejudice still exists and support the
continuation of diversity jurisdiction.2 6 Congress, by amending the diversity
statute in 1958, giving corporations dual citizenship, appears to have accepted
the latter view. 27 However, since Congress has chosen to remain silent rather
than extend these privileges to unincorporated associations, the Supreme
Court acted and rectified this situation.
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad decision has finally made
it clear that the United States Supreme Court no longer recognizes Chapman
and that that decision is now inconsistent with the modern concepts and
functions of diversity jurisdiction. In recognizing an unincorporated association as having a legal existence separate from its members, the court has
opened the doors to the federal courts, where once they were closed if even
one member of the association was a citizen of the same state as the opposing
party. Conversely, the venue when unincorporated associations are now sued
can be chosen with more certainty. It can now be said that substance
governs form and this, coupled with the abandonment of the fiction of nonexistence of unincorporated associations, presages much more consistent
judicial decisions in the future.
Henry Landan
22 See Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REV. 483
(1928); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928); ALI: STUDY OF THE DivIsION OF JURISDIcTiON BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 37-38 (tent. Draft No. 1, 1963) ; Parker, The Federal
Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A.J. 433 (1932).
23 See Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1963).

24 Friendly, supra note 22, at 497.
Since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
follow the substantive law of the forum state in diversity
to continue diversity jurisdiction, as the state courts are
their own substantive law than are the federal courts.
26 Moors & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past,
L. Rev. 1, 15-16 (1965).
27 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
25

requiring the federal courts to
cases, it is no longer reasonable
much more competent to apply
Present and Future, 43 Texas

